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WHY NOT USE THE SPECIAL JURY?*
By JEANNETTE E. THATCIIER*"
"The right of trial by jury shall be preserved ..."
T His theme, with slight verbal variations, appears in the con-
stitutions of forty-six1 of the United States and in the federal
constitution. Jury trial in America is intimately associated with
the actuating causes of the American Revolution, 2 and has a deep
emotional appeal quite aside from its intrinsic merits as a legal
institution. No other part of the judicial system has taken so
prominent a part in popular and professional discussions, nor
evoked such extravagant praise on the one hand and such abundant
criticism on the other.
The jury system has received evaluations ranging from "out-
worn relic' 3 and "sentimental fetich ' '4 to "the crowning masterpiece
of our jurisprudence."5 The great bulk of the citizenry is funda-
mentally satisfied with juries as they exist today, to the extent, that
proffered substitutes for jury trial have received scant considera-
tion. Yet even ardent eulogizers of the jury system have conceded
that it has imperfections, and for generations" various proposed
reforms have been earnestly and voluminously debated. The con-
sensus of opinion nevertheless appears to be that, despite minor
defects in its present application, the principle of a fact-finding
body whose lay members are freshly chosen for the purpose of
each dispute, lending both spontaneity and common sense to
*This article was written in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the L. L. M. degree conferred upon the writer by the University of Minnesota
in June, 1946.
**Member of the Oregon bar.
'Colorado and Louisiana excepted. For a list of the provisions appearing
in the constitutions of the various states, see 2 Thompson, Trials (2d ed.)
Sec. 2226, p. 1478, or Note, (1899) 43 L. R. A. 33, 36.2Among grievances listed in the Declaration of Independence were the
"acts of pretended legislation. . . . For depriving us in many cases, of the
benefits of trial by jury."
3Russell Duane, The Civil Jury Should Be Abolished, (1929) 12 J. Am.
Jud. Soc. 137.
4Charles A. Boston, Some Practical Remedies for Existing Defects in the
Administration of Justice, (1912) 61 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1, 12.
5Charles T. Coleman, Origin and Development of Trial by Jury, (1918)
6 Va. L. Rev. 77.
6 For an early example, see Juries, (1870) 5 L. J. 109, commenting upon
a bill for reform of the English jury system.
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technical rules of law, is superior to any system of professional
jurors ever devised, or to the principle of judge trial.-
Among the pragmatic lapses most often berated are the low
intellectual calibre of jurymen, particularly in metropolitan areas,
and the unsuitability of jurors with only general experience to
try particular cases involving specialized fields. The latter inaptitude
is made especially evident upon the embarrassing occasions when
groups of experts parade conflicting opinions for the supposed
edification of the ordinary jury.
Various suggestions have been made looking toward the cor-
rection of the demerits of the present jury system, such as the
creation of a class of professional jurors, trained in the law of
evidence and experienced in analyzing facts;8 greater voluntary
jury service by businessmen ;9 and the elimination of virtually all
exemptions from jury duty, with improved listing and drawing
methods to insure for every citizen uniform jury service of
limited duration and infrequent recurrence. Surprisingly little at-
tention, however, has been given to the possibilities of the common-
law institution of the special jury.
The jury ordinarily used today in America, a body of twelve
persons drawn by lot from panels taken at hazard from the list of
voters or taxpayers, is properly known as the "common jury" and
7The following quotations illustrate a general preference for settle-
ment of fact questions by juries rather than by judges:
1 Holdsworth, A History of English Law, (6th ecL, rev. 1938), p. 349:
... if a clever man is left to decide by himself disputed questions of fact
he is usually not content simply to decide each case as it arises. He constructs
theories for the decision of analogous cases. These theories are discussed,
doubted, or developed by other clever men when such cases come before them.
The interest is apt to center, not in the dry task of deciding the case before
the court, but rather in the construction of new theories, the reconciliation of
conflicting cases, the demolition and criticism of older views. The result is a
series of carefully constructed, and periodically considered rules, which
merely retard the attainment of a conclusion without assisting in its forma-
tion... The jury system has for some hundreds of years been constantly
bringing the rules of law to the touchstone of contemporary common sense."
Mr. Justice Miller, quoted in 2 Va. L. Reg. (N.S.) 873-874, said: . . . I
am willing to give the benefit of my observation (in the conference room of
the Supreme Court of the United States] . . . that judges are not preeminently
fitted over other men of good judgment in business affairs to decide upon
mere questions of disputed fact."
Chalmers, 7 L. Q. Rev. 19, speaking of chancery courts working with-
out juries: "One finds oneself in a rarefied atmosphere of morality and re-
spectability in which life is hardly possible. Look at the equitable doctrines of
constructive notice and constructive fraud. Look at the impossible standard
of duty laid down for trustees."
8J. W. Pickles, The Jury System-Its Cause and Cure (192-7 Halifax),
p. 14; Boston, loc. cit. supra, footnote 4.
9William T. Ransom, Why Business Men Should Serve on Juries, (1936)
14 Tenn. L. Rev. 181.
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differs considerably from the "special jury." The latter is a body of
twelve men believed to possess better qualifications as triers of
fact in certain types of cases, superiority of the individual jurors
being demonstrated by the nature of their respective trades or
businesses, or in England by their fulfillment of property qualifica-
tions higher than those of common jurors. To form a special jury
(in its simple original form), from a list containing the names of
twenty-four men so qualified, and unexceptionable on grounds of
actual bias, the parties are permitted alternately to strike names
until the number is reduced to twelve. The twelve jurors thus
selected constitute the jury impaneled for trial of the case, such a
jury being also denominated a "struck jury" because of the
manner of selection.
It is the purpose of this article: (1) to trace the historical
origins and development of the special jury, with special emphasis
on its form at the time American legal institutions were adapted
from their English counterparts; (2) to evaluate the common-law
special jury, comparing the comments of those who have known
this institution in operation; (3) to examine the legal basis for use
of special juries in American courts; (4) to survey contemporary
American use of the special jury as a part of the legal systems
of the states; and, finally (5) to consider the extent to which
current use of the special jury may be a partial correction of
today's jury system.
I. HISTORICAL ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPECIAL JURY.
Development of Special Jury in England.
The special jury is so very old that even in 1696 its origins
were lost in antiquity. In the oldest case' ° cited by Tidd's work
on King's Bench practice," a standard practice book at the turn of
the nineteenth century, the court described its issuance of a rule
for the formation of a special jury as "according to the ancient
course."
Again in Rex v. Edmonds12 in 1821 a King's Bench court ob-
served that it had not "hitherto been ascertained at what time the
practice of appointing special juries for trials at nisi prius first
began." The earliest example known of the use of a special jury
'
0 Anonymous, (1696) 1 Salk. 405, Trinity Term, 8 William III.
"Tidd, The Practice of the Court of King's Bench in Personal Actions
(1st Amer. Ed. 1807), p. 72.
12(1821) 4 B. & Ald. 471, 106 Eng. Rep. 1009.
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was a London jury -of cooks and fishmongers who in 1351 were
called whire the defendant was accused of selling bad food.13 In
1450 a special jury was impaneled for a murder case. 14 And in
1645 in a case between two merchants "touching merchants' affairs"
the Court of King's Bench granted a motion for a jury of mer-
chants to try the issue.' 5
Apparently this institution fell into disuse for a time for in
1730 it was felt necessary to enact a statute confirming the right
to trial by special jury. The statute, 3 Geo. II, c. 25,11 expressly
"authorized and required" the courts to form special juries in
both criminal 7 and civil cases "in such manner as special Juries
have been, and are usually struck in such Courts respectively."
The practice was to strike from a panel of twenty-four names
prepared by the prothonotary, until the panel was reduced to
twelve jurors.
Three years later, toward the expiration of the statute 3 Geo. II,
duration of which had been limited to three years, the statute 6
Geo.-II, c. 37,18 was enacted to continue and to make perpetual
the former statute and several others, largely on unrelated sub-
jects.29 The 1733 statute also extended the right to certain other
counties in England, not expressly included in the earlier statute.
13(1351) Ryley, Mem. London, 266; James B. Thayer, The Jury and Its
Development, Part II, (1892) 5 Harv. L. Rev. 295, 300.
14Forsythe, Trial by Jury (1852), p. 173. Rotulae Parliamentae V, 213.
252 Lil. Pract. Reg. 154. A case similarly involving merchants decided
about the same time was Pickering v. Barkley, (1649) Styles 132, 82 Eng.
Rep. 587. In an Action upon the covenant of a charter-party which was vir-
tually a contract of insurance, the question arose whether the seizure of a
merchant ship by unknown pirates was within an exception in the charter-
party of "dangers of the sea." The court, holding that the contract was to
be interpreted according to the custom of merchants, ordered that merchants
be brought into court to decide the matter. The merchants having apparently
agreed that taking by pirates was a peril of the sea, judgment wvas given for
plaintiff nil capiat per billam.
166 Hawkins, Stat. at L. (1734). The statute, entitled "An Act for the
better Regulation of Juries," recited in the preamble that ". . . some doubt
hath been conceived touching the Power of his Majesty's Courts of Law at
Westminster, to appoint Juries to be struck before the ... proper Officer of
such respective Courts."
17Felonies were excepted, doubtless to assure such defendants the greater
advantage of twenty peremptory challenges permitted in felony cases tried
before common juries. Thompson & Merriam on Juries (1882) Sec. 161, state:
"A struck jury was never granted at common law for the trial at bar of a
capital case, and the reason in one case was stated to be.'for then the prisoner
would lose his challenges."' (Citing Rex v. Duncomb, 12 Mod. 224.)
186 Hawkins, Stat. at L. (1734).
19 Included among these was 4 Geo. II, c. 7, an act amending 3 Geo. If,
c. 25, insofar as it applied to Middlesex County with respect to services and
qualifications of jurors.
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A slight modification in the mode of handling costs of special
juries was added by 24 Geo. II, c. 19 in 1751, placing the burden
of the fees for striking the jury and other fees caused by use of
the special jury upon the person requesting its use. The judge,
however, had power to certify that the cause was a proper one
for use of a special jury, thus permitting assessment of costs
against the loser as usual. The statute also limited the fees to be
received by special jurors.
Subsequent legislation on the subject of special juries was
embodied in the consolidation statute known as the County Juries
Act, 6 Geo. IV, c. 50 (1825),20 Sections 30 to 35 of which dealt
with special juries. Under this act there was no change in the
nature of occasions for the use of special juries, or in the proce-
dure for obtaining a court order that a special jury be impaneled
in particular causes. There was an increase in the number of
nominations of jurors from twenty-four to forty-eight, and a
substantial modification in the method of nominating from selec-
tion by choice to selection partially by hazard. The procedure for
reduction of the jury by striking from the list of forty-eight names
remained unchanged. An interesting sidelight on the jury system as
a whole is furnished by Section 60 of the same act, which abolished
the already disused writ of attaint, formerly employed to punish
jurors for verdicts at variance with those of subsequent juries
retrying the same cases.
In 1852 the Common Law Procedure Act, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 76,
Section 108 to 113,21 established a method whereby in the courts
of assize, the striking procedure might be dispensed with and
special jurors be balloted for and called in the order in which they
were drawn, or in the same manner as common jurors. A proviso
retained the earlier practice of striking, making it discretionary
with the judge which method should be employed in a given assize
case.2 2 In 1870 a similar provision was adopted with respect to
special juries in London and Middlesex counties,2 3 expressly mak-
ing uniform the practice in all of the counties.
The final step in the legislative development of English special
juries took place in 1922 when the practice of striking special
206 Lely, Chitty's Statutes (5th ed. 1895) title, Juries, pp. 1-24.
2tLely, op. cit., p. 26.
22A year later in 1853, Hilary Term, Rule 44 of the general court rules
provided that applications for special juries should be accompanied by affi-
davit either stating that no notice for trial had been given or naming a date
of notice for trial not less than six (lays later. (R. G. H. T. 44.)23Lely, op. cit., p. 36, Juries Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict., c. 77, Sees. 16-18.
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juries was abolished,2 4 and such juries were in all cases 2, balloted
for in the same manner as common juries. The chief difference
between special and common juries in England today is the higher
qualifications of special jurors. It is to be noted that the 1922
Juries Act, though modifying the manner of listing jurors to the
extent of eliminating the necessity for statement of the "addition"
or title and degree of each juror, still requires that "the profession,
calling or business of the juror" shall be set out.
The Operation of the Special Jury circa 1776.
At common law the procedure for obtaining a special jury
was initiated by motion of the party desiring that type of jury.
Granting of the motion before 1751 rested in the sound discretion
of the court, but after enactment of 24 Geo. II, c. 18, Section 1, was
matter of course. Thereafter, upon presentation of a written
motion over counsel's signature, the clerk of rules automatically
drew up a rule for a special jury. An appointment for nomination
of the special jtiry panel was then made with the master, prothono-
tary, or other subordinate official charged with the duty of nomi-
nating, the time for the appointment being endorsed upon the
rule.-" A copy of the rule and endorsement was served upon the
adverse party and upon the under-sheriff. The latter, as the cus-
todian of the jury book, was required to attend the master at the
appointed time and place, bringing the jury book for use of the
master. Then in the presence of both parties or their respective
counsel (or in the presence of one party if the other did not choose
to attend) the master compiled from the jury book a list of forty-
eight names, selecting the names in his discretion, giving con-
sideration to the occupation and general reputation of the juror.2-
24Aggs, Chitty's Annual Statutes of 1922, title, Jury, p. 678, Juries Act,
1922, 12 & 13'Geo. V, c. 11, Sec. 5.
250ne class of cases was expressly excepted, those cases involving trial of
a question of disputed compensation under the Lands Clauses Consolidation
Act, 1845, in which the manner of striking a special jury remained unchanged.
Aggs, loc. cit.; 6 Halsbury, Laws of England (Hailsham Ed. 1932), pp.
115-116, title Compulsory Purchase of Land.
26The procedure here detailed is based upon Archbold, King's Bench
Practice (1st Ed. 1826) and 2 Tidd, Practice of the Court of King's Bench
in Personal Actions (1st Amer. Ed. 1807).
27in Rex v. Edmonds, (1821) 4 B. & AId. 471, 106 Eng. Rep. 1009, the
defendant obtained a rule nisi for new trial because of the disallowance of
his challenge to the array on the grounds, inter alia, of "unindifferency" of the
maister and of the master's personal selection of the names of jurors rather
than ihe choice of names by hazard. The rule was discharged on other
grounds (see footnote 29) but the court indicated in dictum that these
grounds of challenge were untenable.
Later, however, personal selection of the names by the master was elimi-
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As each oral nomination was made, either party had the right to
object to the proposed juror for cause, and if the ground of in-
capacity was established to the satisfaction of the official, the
objectionable name was set aside and a different name was pro-
posed. When all forty-eight names had been selected, the official
compiled a list of the names for each of the parties and appointed
a new time and place for the striking.
At the later date appointed, each party was entitled to strike
from the list twelve names without indicating any cause, the parties
taking alternate strikes, beginning with the plaintiff. If either
of the parties failed or refused to attend, the master struck twelve
names in his behalf.2 8 The twenty-four jurors remaining were
summoned for the date of trial by issuance of "special jury
process." On trial the parties had a right to challenge the array
for defect in the nomination or striking procedure and a right to
challenge the polls for cause.29 There was no right of peremptory
challenge at the trial, the right of striking being considered an
analogous privilege.30 Where there was no successful challenge to
the array, the first twelve jurors in the box against whom no
cause for challenge to the polls was established, comprised the
jury for trial of the case.
Ordinarily a special jury could be organized on the basis just
outlined, but there were collateral rules to deal with other sets
of circumstances which occasionally arose before actual trial
could be begun. Where in a special jury cause jurors whose names
were on the struck panel appeared in insufficient number to try
the cause, the court upon the request of plaintiff could order the
nated and an element of chance in selection of the names was provided by tile
County Juries Act of 1825, which required use of a numbered list of specialjurors, with a box of corresponding numbers written on small cards or
pieces of parchment, the numbers being drawn from the box at random. If an
objection for cause was interposed to any juror whose name was su, drawn,
a new number was taken from the box.2SAnonymous, (1696) 1 Salk. 405, Case 1, 91 Eng. Rep. 352.29Rex v. Edmonds, supra, footnote 27. The Court of King's Bench in a
criminal action for conspiracy dismissed a rule nisi for new trial, holding that
challenges to the array and to the polls were premature and irregular where
made before twelve of the original panel had appeared.
S0Thompson & Merriam on Juries (1882), Sec. 161: "A statute grant-
ing peremptory challenges has no application in special jury causes. The
right of peremptory challenge is considered to have been exercised in
striking the jury." See also Creed v. Fisher, (1854) 23 L. J. Ex. 143, 15
Eng. Rul. Cas. 54, an action for assault and battery, in which the trial court
refused to permit a peremptory challenge on trial because it was a special
jury case. A rule nisi for new trial based on this refusal was discharged,
the court holding that, although it was a common practice not to call a special
juror who was objected to, it was not a matter of right except where there
was cause.
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summoning of talesmen to fill the iury. even without consent of the
defendant.", Where a rule for special jury was obtained upon
motion of the defendant, and the jury had been struck but no special
jury process had been issued, the cause could not be tried by a
common jury.3- In such a case, it was advisable for the plaintiff
to sue out the special jury process himself to avoid intentional
delay of trial by a recalcitrant defendant.3 3 Although special juries
were sometimes applied for by defendants purely for purposes of
delay, since the special jury cases ordinarily were not brought to
trial until after the regular term, the courts easily devised means
of controlling defendants and thereby preventing injustice to
plaintiffs.34
II. EVALUATioN OF THE COmmON-LAw SPECIAL JURY.
The comments of historians and reformers who have studied
and compared the common and the special jury are, for the most
part, favorable to the special jury. Holdsworth, renowned English
legal historian, had nothing but praise for the jury system as a
whole.3 5 Comparing special and common juries, he found the
former superior, and commented:
"Though a good special jury is admitted to be a very competent
3'Gatliffe v. Bourne, (1838) 2 M. & Rob. 100.322 Chitty's Statutes (3rd ed. 1865), title Juries, annotations pp.
919-920, 930-931, citing Holt v. Medowcroft, 4 M. & S. 467, Haldane v.
Beauderk, 3 Ex. 658, and Montague v. Smith, 21 L. J. Q. B. 73, 17 Q. B.
688.
332 Tidd, Practice of the Court of King's Bench, p. 729, Ch. XXXV at
footnote (y).
34In King v. Burridge, (1724) 8 Mod. 245, 248, 88 Eng. Rep. 175, the
defendant in order to delay the trial struck the names of all hundredors
from the panel, then challenged the array for want of hundredors. The trial
courtes action in attaching him for contempt of court was upheld.
In White v. Eastern Union Ry. Co., (1852) 21 L. J. C. P. 112, plaintiff,
claiming delay, asked that the defendant's rule for a special jury be dis-
charged, where defendant had nominated but not reduced the jury. The
court refused to set aside the order for a special jury, but permitted plaintiff
himself to reduce the jury.
A common practice in 1826 was to require the defendant to undertake
to give judgment as of the term in which the case would otherwise have
been tried. If defendant would not so undertake, the court would discharge
the rule for a special jury. 1 Archbold, The Practice of the Court of King's
Bench (2d Amer. Ed. 1838) pp. 180-182. See also, id. (1st Ed. 1826). In
the Court of Common Pleas, where the person applying for a special jury
did not satisfactorily deny a charge of the adverse party that delay was
the true motive for the application, the chief justice would direct the cause
to be tried in term, unless the defendant submitted to such terms as would
obviate the objection. Tidd, loc. cit., at footnote (z).
351 Holdsworth, A History of English Law (6th Ed., Rev. 1938) pp.
347-350: ..... Litigants are generally contented with the measure of justice
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tribunal, the common jury may be composed of persons who have
neither the desire nor the capacity to weigh the evidence, or to
arrive at a conclusion upon the facts in issue."36
Maximus A. Lesser 37 held a similar view, taking the attitude
that common juries were so little reliable that special juries were
preferable, especially in cases of length and importance. Lord
Justice Bramwell in an address in the 1870's to the grand jury8
complained bitterly that special juries or special jurors were not
used in important criminal cases, exclaiming: "It is outrageous
.. that you should take the best men and leave them out of a jury
who are to try a man for his life, and try a trumpery running down
case, or an action on a bill of exchange for 50 1., with picked men."
Mark Thompson,39 contemporary historian, felt that, following
the enactment of 3 Geo. II, c. 25 in 1730, special juries under Lord
Mansfield had played an important part in the development of
commercial law.
The only acrimonious thrust against special juries which has
been found was made by Jeremy Bentham, who disapproved of the
jury system as a whole. In about 1809 Bentham wrote a book
criticizing the jury system, which he entitled "Elements of the Art
of Packing as Applied to Juries." His thesis was that jurors could
be and were selected improperly and used, especially in libel cases,
as instruments of injustice to enable the government to secure con-
victions for political purposes. The caustic reformer devoted an
which they [juries] mete out; and this is no small gain to a legal system.
S.. The jury itself is educated by the part which it is required to take in
the administration of justice. The jury system teaches the members of thejury to cultivate a judicial habit of mind. It helps to create in them a
respect for law and order .... The effects of the jury system upon the law
are no less remarkable and no less beneficial. It tends to make the law
intelligible by keeping it in touch with the common facts of life. . . . .rhejury is to the inside technical world of our common law system a representa-
tive of that outside sense, and cutbide animation."
36Holdsworth, op. cit., p. 347. According to Mr. Pickles, Holdsworth
wrote the passages quoted in 1903. J. W. Pickles, The Jury System-Its
Cause and Cure, p. 7, cited supra footnote 8.37Lesser, The Historical Development of the Jury System (Lawyers
Co-op. Publ. Co. 1894), Ch. XII, pp. 217-218, footnote 59.
38Justice Bramwell's address was reported in an editorial, Special
Jurors in Criminal Trials, (1878) 13 L. J. 227. In his address Bramwell
pointed out that undersheriffs in England and Wales persistently mis-
interpreted clearly worded acts of Parliament, with the result that special
jurors were exempted from common jury duty, contrary, Bramwell con-
tended, to the express will of Parliament. The editor commented: "This
state of things has gone on so long that society takes it as a matter of course
that criminals should be tried by a panel of common jurors."39Thompson, A Constitutional History of England, 1642 to 1801 (Lon-
don 1938), Part IV, The Age of Conservatism (1720-1801), Ch. XI,
Justice, pp. 411-420.
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entire chapter 0 to "Special Juries, a Special Engine of Corrup-
tion." Although Bentham has a notable reputation as a legal
reformer and was probably responsible for some beneficial changes
in the English judicial system, it is difficult to believe that his
attitude with respect to juries was justifiable.
The circumstances of publication of Bentham's criticism of
the jury system are significant, indicating strongly that his atti-
tude was neither typical nor contemporaneously acceptable. When
Bentham had his book ready for publication, the bookseller to
whom he offered it hesitated to publish it because of the extremely
forceful criticisms it contained. Bentham's friend Sir Samuel
Romilly wrote the author a letter dated January 31, 1810 urging
him not to publish the book on the ground that Bentham would un-
doubtedly be subjected to criminal prosecution for libel, together
with the bookseller who had the audacity to publish the vitriolic
work. Romilly was convinced that Attorney General Vicary Gibbs,
then in office, would be certain to prosecute Bentham."' A biogra-
pher remarked: "... . indeed the Chief Justice and his fellows were
assailed in such terms that conviction would have been as certain as
prosecution."4 2 Probably as a result of his friends' importunity,
Bentham delayed publication for over ten years, the book being
first printed in 1821, or the year after the death of Attorney
General Gibbs.
Thompson makes it plain that he disagrees with Bentham's
views on special juries.43 In the footnote appended to a guarded
reference to Bentham's assertions with respect to improper con-
duct of libel cases, Thompson remarked: "How much truth there
was in this allegation I cannot say. Juries did not always find the
defendant guilty, and this is evidence of their independence."
Folwell, Minnesota historian,"4 describing the experiment with
special juries in Minnesota from 1864 to 1897, was almost com-
pletely neutral in his evaluation of the merits or demerits of special
juries. He reviewed the history of the adoption and repeal of this
"curiosity in legislation" and commented:
"No evidence has been found of any general dissatisfaction with
struck juries and it is probable that the general public did not
much concern itself about them. There is reason to believe that liti-
4 0Bentham, Elements of the Art of Packing as Applied to Juries, CI. IV.
41The circumstances are related in Atkinson, Jeremy Bentham, (London
1905), Ch. VII, pp. 157-159.
42Atkinson, loc. cit.43Thompson, op. cit. supra, footnote 39, p. 4 12 at footnotes 2 and 3.
443 Folwell, A History of Minnesota (1926), pp. 227-230.
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gants who had had some experience with them at heavy costs had
not found them better than the ordinary jury. Lawyers generally
found few or no advantages in them.... There has been no demand
for its revival.
' 45
Several sources have been found to be critical of the special
jury in its use as between wealthy and poor litigants. An editorial
of 1871 in an English legal journal40 expressed this criticism and
stated that "the main object of the present article is to inaugurate,
if possible, a movement for the purpose of doing away with the
present system by which causes are tried by special juries at the
option of either party." The author felt that a rich defendant might
at his option impose upon a poor plaintiff against his will "a
class of tribunal which by its instincts would be prejudiced in
favour of the former." He suggested-that the court in such cases
should be empowered in its discretion to impanel any available
jurors. A similar criticism was made recently by an English
author.41 The latter author, who evinced an attitude favoring
improvement of the jury system as a whole but did not appear
to support any particular reform proposal, nevertheless demon-
strated that he believed special juries to be superior to common
juries, stating:
"A special jury is likely to be composed, partly at least, of
men who would fail in their business if they were not fairly ac-
curate in their estimate of credibility. In cases involving fraud
such juries may be far better than the judge. A common jury may
or may not have any particular ability.
48
In summation of the value of the special jury it may be re-
marked that the institution of the special jury endured in England
virtually unchanged for not less than five centuries. The special
jury is still in use in England, performing a valuable function,
with the selection procedure modified, but the principle unchanged.
These facts significantly indicate that the special jury has much to
contribute to the Anglo-American judicial system.
451Ibid., 230.
4oEditorjal, Trial by Special and by Common Jury, 51 L. T. 43, 44
(1871).
47R. M. Jackson, Jury Trial Today, (1938) 6 Camb. L. J. 367, 378:
"Questions of money can only be settled by talking about figures. To send
a jury away with the idea that if they find for the plaintiff they are to give
'substantial damages' means very little. Some jurymen feel that £100 is
substantial, whilst others plunge for £25,000. The wealthier jurymen natural-
ly think in larger amounts. In personal injury cases special juries are
apt to give bigger amounts. In pre-War days the London General Omnibus
Company and the Railway Companies ceased applying for special juries
because on the average they [common juries] awarded lower damages."
48(1938) 6 Camb. L. J. 367, 375.
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III. LEaAL BASIS FOR TRIAL By SPECIAL JURY IN THE
UNITED STATES.
The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution
preserves "the right of trial by jury" without making any attempt
to define that phrase. It has been universally understood, however,
that this clause was intended to protect the right of jury trial as it
existed at common law. 49
Although the state constitutions use somewhat variant language,
e. g., that the right of jury trial "shall remain," 50 shall "be pre-
served," 51 "ought to be held sacred,"51 2 "ought to remain sacred
and inviolable," 53 shall be "as heretofore,""' or "shall remain
inviolate,"55 the import of all of the phrases is substantially identi-
cal with that of the federal constitution and with each other. Occa-
sionally these differences in wording do result in different inter-
pretations of the meaning of the constitutional provision in ques-
tion. Most state courts have held that their respective constitu-
tional provisions preserved the mode of jury trial existing at com-
mon law.58 Several states, however, have held that the constitu-
tional provision secured in those states the right of jury trial as it
existed at the time of the adoption of the state constitution, 5 or
as it had become known to the "previous jurisprudence of the
state."58
The question arises whether the special jury was such a part of
the common-law institution of trial by jury as to fall within the
guarantees of the federal and state constitutions. The American
decisions abound in statements which seem to bear upon this
49Liberty Oil Co. v. Condon National Bank, (1922) 260 U. S. 235, 242-
243, 43 S. Ct. 118, 67 L. Ed. 232, 236; Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, (1899)
174 U. S. 1, 19 S. Ct. 580, 583, 43 L. Ed. 873; McKeon v. Central Stamping
Co., (C.C.A. 3d 1920) 264 Fed. 385.
50Michigan Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27.
5West Virginia Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 13.
52Virginia Constitution, Bill of Rights, Art. I, Sec. 13.
53North Carolina Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 19.54Delaware Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 4; Illinois Constitution, Art. II,
Sec. 5; Missouri Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28; and Pennsylvania Consti-
tution, Art I, Sec. 6.
55This, the most frequently used phrase, is found in the constitutions
of 30 states.
56Ex parte Dawson, (1911) 20 Ida. 178, 117 Pac. 696, 35 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1146; Fleming James, Jr., Trial by Jury and the New Federal Rules
of Procedure, (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 1022.57Peters v. City of Duluth, (1912) 119 Minn. 96, 137 N. W. 390, 41
L. R. A. (N.S.) 1044; Berry v. St. L. & S. F. Railroad, (1909) 223 Mo.
358, 122 S. W. 1043; Barry v. Truax, (N.D. 1904) 99 N. W. 769; Moot v.
Moot, (1915) 214 N. Y. 204, 108 N. E. 424; Tnbou v. Strowbridge, (1879)
7 Or. 157.58Swart v. Kimball, (1880) 43 Mich. 443, 448.
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question, but the issue has been squarely presented only a few
times.
In Fowler v. State59 the defendants in a criminal prosecution
for conspiring against the election laws brought a writ of error
following their conviction in the lower court. They contended that
the use of a struck jury in their trial was unconstitutional and
urged that the constitutional provision that "the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate" required use of an ordinary jury, not a
special jury. The New Jersey Supreme Court overruled the objec-
tion and affirmed the conviction, stating:
"The obvious answer to this objection is that the trial by a
struck jury was part of the system of legal procedure derived by the
people of this state from the English law, and that it was confirmed
and regulated by legislation in this commonwealth as early as the
year 1797 (Pol. Laws), which was 47 years before the constitution
of 1844 was established. The constitutional mandate referred to,
therefore, did nothing more than to ratify and perpetuate the right
of trial by jury as, in substance, it then existed." 0
The decision of the intermediate appellate court was later
taken to the New Jersey court of last resort, where the Court of
Errors and Appeals unanimously affirmed the judgment per curiam
"for the reasons given by the supreme court." 1
Substantially the same question was again presented to the
New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals in Brown v. State"2
where the court was asked to hold invalid a New Jersey statute of
1898 providing for struck juries. The court held the statute was
constitutional, observing that the act had descended from a New
Jersey statute of 1797 which embodied the original English statute,
3 Geo. II, c. 25. The case was then taken to the United States
Supreme Court, under the name Brown v. New Jersey,03 where
it was contended that the statute was invalid as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The contention was rejected, the court
holding that there was no violation of the due process clause be-
cause the state constitution, as interpreted by the state court,
authorized the statute providing for trial by struck jury. It was
held further that it was not a violation of the equal protection
clause that the defendant was not given the same number of chal-
lenges to which he would have been entitled before an ordinary
jury, because the requirement of the equal protection clause was
59(1896) 58 N. J. Law 423, 34 AtI. 682.
60Id. at 423, 34 AtI. at 682.
61(1896) 59 N. J. L. 585, 39 At!. 1113.
62(1899) 62 N. J. Law 666,42 AtI. 811.
63 (1899) 175 U. S. 172, 20 S. Ct. 77, 44 L. Ed. 119.
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fulfilled where the same number of challenges is allowed in all
special jury cases.
In the Fowler and Brown Cases, supra, it was held that no
constitutional right had been violated where special juries were
used. In the Missouri case of State ex rel. St. L. K. & N. W. Ry.
Co. v. Withrow,"' the denial of a special jury was complained of
as a deprivation of a constitutional right. The defendant had ap-
plied for a special jury in a condemnation proceeding instituted
by the railway compahy, but the court denied the application except
as modified by court rules setting up a novel system which de-
stroyed the characteristics of a special jury. Both parties had
refused to proceed further under the court rules so imposed and
the trial judge had refused to permit withdrawal of the application
for special jury. Both- parties then became relators in a proceeding
to obtain a writ of prohibition restraining the judge from acting
in excess of his jurisdiction, the relators stating that the cause was
one of great moment, involving valuable property and large dam-
ages. The appellate court awarded prohibition, holding the lower
court's rule invalid as an infringement of the constitutional right
of plaintiffs to have a special jury. There was a dissent in which the
position was taken that the right to have a special jury was not
an essential feature of a trial by jury at common law and was not
preserved by the Missouri Constitution. The majority stated:
".... Special juries, it need scarcely be said, were familiar adjuncts
and adjuvants in the administration of justice from the earliest
period of the common law."65
"... Our legislature, by adopting as it did, the term 'special jury'
must be presumed to have done so, with a full understanding of the
meaning, force and effect which that expression had acquired
during its long sojourn at common law. And Section 28 of the bill
of rights declares that 'the right of trial by jury, as heretofore
enjoyed, shall remain inviolate,' which means that all the substan-
tial incidents and consequences which pertained to the right of
trial by jury are beyond the reach of hostile legislation, and are
preserved in their ancient substantial extent as existing at com-
mon law."68
Later in the same year another Missouri railway company
sought to require the use.of a special jury by applying for writ
of prohibition to prevent the drawing of a petit jury to try a case
then pending against the relator. State ex rel. Kan-sas City & S. E.
Ry. Co. v. Slover67 was in effect a direct attack upon the consti-
64(1896) 133 Mo. 500,34 S. W. 245, 36 S. W. 43.
651d. at 516, 36 S. W. at 46.
66d. at 519, 36 S. W. at 48.
67(1896) 134 Mo. 607,36 S. W. 50.
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tutionality of an 1891 statute providing for petit juries, the
relator charging that the act was a denial of the right to special
jury guaranteed by the Missouri Constitution. The court denied
the writ, holding that the act was constitutional whether the slatute
was construed ". . . as abolishing all distinction between common
and special juries, or as conferring upon a party the right to a
jury different from the regular panel and special only in that sense,
or as prescribing the qualifications and method of selecting a
special jury when allowed by the court in its discretion ... "
On the constitutional status of the special jury the court, by
reasoning detailed in the margin, 8 concluded:
"The historical twelve was an absolute legal right. It was this
'right,' which our constitution secures, but a special venire was not
a legal right but rested in the discretion of the court and hence has
not passed into a constitutional right, and in the absence of a limita-
tion upon the people in their legislative capacity, they can abolish
the right to a special jury altogether."""
Missouri citizens were apparently not satisfied with this state
of the law, for in 1899 a statute was enacted which permitted use
of special juries in cities over 100,000 population. The constitu-
tionality of this statute was challenged in a personal injury case,
Eckrich v. St. Louis Transit Co.,7 0 by the plaintiff, a common
laborer. The court, in upholding the constitutionality of the act,
used language broad enough to intimate that a special jury was
demandable as a constitutional right,71 although it had refused to
take that position seven years earlier in the Slover Case.
681d. at 612, 36 S. W. at 51 : "... no reason can be given why the people
in their sovereign capacity may not improve the method of selecting a jury
by excluding from the list those unfit by crime or immorality, or by repeal-
ing the freehold qualification of the common law, or any property qualifica-
tion. Nor can we perceive how the impartiality of the jury can be lessened
by the fact that the duty of selection is no longer confided in one man, the
sheriff or coroner, but a list of all qualified citizens is placed in a box or
wheel, well mixed and the panel drawn therefrom by the clerk in the presence
of the court or judge."691d. at 614, 36 S. W. at 52.
70(1903) 176 Mo. 621, 75 S. W. 759, 62 L. R. A. 911.
7lId. at 651, 75 S. W. at 764: ". . . no intimation can be gleaned from
the act of Congress or from these territorial laws that any other kind of
a jury than such a jury as was known at common law was intended. That
was the only kind of a jury the fathers of our country knew or had any
respect for. Therefore, when the act of 1816 was passed, adopting the common
law of England and the statutes of England passed prior to the fourth year
of James I as part of the law of Missouri, the common-law juries, regular
and special, were adopted, and became a part of the system of our laws
and of the machinery of our courts. This being true, they were the kinds
of juries that the Constitution of 1820 guarantied [sic]. There were no
Missouri juries, as distinguished from common-law juries, prior to the
adoption of the Constitution of 1820."
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General statements are often found to the effect that the con-
stitution does not guarantee the ancient forms of the common
law,"2 or that, so long as the substantive right to jury trial is
preserved, the process by which the jury is selected is wholly
within the discretion of the legislature and may be regulated by
statute."2 Such statements, however, are of little value in the
present problem as they are not specifically related to special juries.
Nor are those cases helpful which attempt to relate the "right of
trial by jury" back to the Magna Charta. 4
As no case interpreting the effect of the federal constitution
has been found, and as the state authorities are inconclusive, it
will be necessary to develop both aspects of the question under
discussion in order to determine the prospective usefulness of the
special jury. It will be first assumed that the special jury was
included within the guarantees of both the federal and state
constitutions.
If the "Right of Trial by Jury" Includes Special Juries.
It is a well-established rule that the Seventh Amendment of
the United States Constitution has application only to trials in
federal courts, and not to trials in state courts. 75 It is equally well
settled that the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury
applies to the territories.78 Accordingly, it seems clear that in -all
72Manning v. State, (1927) 155 Tenn. 266, 292 S. W. 451.73People v. Peete, (1921) 54 Cal. App. 333, 202 Pac. 51; Akely v.
Kinnicut, (1924) 203 N. Y. S. 747, aff'd 238 N. Y. 466, 144 N. E. 682; Brown
v. State, (1918) 14 Old. Cr. 609, 174 Pac. 1102, 1105; State v. Mercier,
(1925) 98 Vt 268, 127 At. 715.74State v. Chase, (1923) 106 Or. 263, 270, 211 Pac. 920: "The not
infrequent remark that by using the words 'trial by jury' is meant a
common-law jury, is inaccurate, to say the least. It is safe to say that in a
majority of the states one or more of the qualifications of a common-lawjuror are ignored by the statutes....
"The common-sense view of the whole matter is that the intention of
the framers of the Constitution* was to insure to a defendant the right
guaranteed by the Magna Charta, namely, a trial by an impartial jury of
his peers, leaving details as to competency and method of selection to the
legislature...."
Italics supplied. The not-uncommon belief that the Magna Charta
guaranteed trial by jury as we know it has been proved incorrect. Hatcher,
Magna Charta and the Jury System, (1935) 42 W. Va. Q. 1, explaining why
the Magna Charta has no relation to trial by jury.75Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, (1916) 241 U. S. 211, 36
S. Ct. 595, 60 L. Ed. 961; Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington,(1917) 243 U. S. 219, 37 S. Ct 260, 61 L. Ed. 685, aff'g State v. Mountain
Timber Co., (1913) 75 Wash. 581, 135 Pac. 645.76Webster v. Reid, (1850) 11 How. 460, 13 L. Ed. 761; Kennon v.
Gilmer, (1899) 131 U. S. 28, 9 S. Ct. 696, 33 L. Ed. 110; Whallon v.
Bancroft, (1860) 4 Minn. 109. In Thompson v. Utah, (1896) 170 U. S. 346,
18 S. Ct 620, 42 L. Ed. 1061, the court said this was no longer an open
question.
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places in the United States outside of the original thirteen states
wherever territorial status existed, the local practice must have
included trial by jury as secured by the federal constitution. There-
upon, as each territory attained statehood and adopted a consti-
tution guaranteeing jury trial, the local practice then current must
have been continued and preserved as an unalterable feature of
the state judicial system. It follows that, in the absence of specific
constitutional change, the jury trial guaranteed by the constitutions
of all states in which territorial government preceded statehood, is
the same as jury trial at common law, the characteristics thereof
having been indirectly controlled by the United States Consti-
tution.
In the case of states which were formed without passing
through territorial status, it is purely a historical question as to
what the practice with respect to special juries was in those states
at the time of the adoption of the local constitutional provisions
guaranteeing jury trial. 77 Jury trial in the original thirteen states,
which adopted their state constitutions at about the time of the
adoption of the federal constitution, would seem to have been
based directly upon the common-law system of jury trial then in
force. Accordingly, if the right of jury trial guaranteed by the
federal constitution does include a right to use of the common-law
special jury, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a special
jury would be demandable as of right in most if not all states, ir-
respective of legislation on the subject of special juries.
If the "Right of Trial by Jury" Does Not Include Special Juries.
On the other hand, even if the special jury is not a part of
the jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment of the
United States Constitution, nor of similar state constitutional pro-
visions, nevertheless the special jury is consonant with the spirit
of American judicial administration and is not objectionable on
constitutional grounds.
The constitutionality of a Minnesota statute8 authorizing use
of special juries was very carefully considered in Lonmen v.
Minneapoli, Gaslight Co.78 Two provisions of the Minnesota Con-
77This historical question has not been pursued here. A further matter
of historical investigation which has not been undertaken in this study is
the ascertainment of the dates of inclusion in each state constitution of the
particular phrases guaranteeing jury trial.78Minn. Laws 1895, c. 328, a re-enactment of Minn. Laws 1864, c. 31
(G.S. 1878, c. 71, secs. 50-19), which had been repealed by Minn. Laws
1891, c.184.
-9(1896) 65 Minn. 196, 68 N. W. 53.
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stitution were urged as barring the special jury statute: (1) the
clause providing that "the right of trial by jury shall remain in-
violate," and (2) the -clause providing that everyone "ought to
ebtain justice freely and without purchase." The court summarily
disposed of the arguments based, upon the second clause, explain-
ing that it had a well-known historical meaning, and was "aimed
against the corrupt practice of taking bribes and exacting illegal
fees in the administration of justice, and never meant that a
litigant should have the right to conduct his suit in court without
cost." 0
The Minnesota court held further that the act did not violate
the constitutional provision guaranteeing jury trial. To answer the
question, which was stated to be "an historical one," the court
looked to the practice with respect to jury trial "as known at com-
mon law and as it existed in the territory of Minnesota at the
time of the adoption of the constitution. ... 81 After reviewing
the common-law history of the special jury and surveying the use
of special juries in the early history of other states, the court
stated at 214:
"The .courts and the bar everywhere seem to have assumed
that the constitutionality of such laws was beyond question ...
Struck or special juries, and the present mode of selecting them,
had been known to and recognized by the law, as being in accord-
ance with the common-law right of trial by jury, for ages before
the adoption of the constitution of this state. It is rather late in this
day to discbver the unconstitutionality of such acts; and it would
certainly require great temerity for courts now to assume to have
discovered some new ground on which to hold them invalid."
And at 216:
"In view of such a consensus of opinion on the part of the legis-
latures, and impliedly of the courts and bar, of the country, that
statutes of this kind do not impair the common-law right of trial
-by jury as known and understood in American constitutional law,
we would not be warranted in holding this act unconstitutional."
Upon analysis of the elements of the guarantee of jury trial
the court concluded that the special jury was unexceptionable. The
objection was urged that the element of lot or fortuity found in
the common jury had been eliminated by the Minnesota statute
under attack, but the court overruled the objection, observing at
210:
"As already suggested these [the element of fortuity and the right
of peremptory challenge] are not essential or substantive elements
sold. at 208, 68 N. W. at 54.
811d. at 209, 68 N. W. at 54.
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of a jury trial, but merely means of securing one of those elements,
viz. impariality. Fortuity in the selection of a jury was unknown
at common law, the panel being selected by the sheriff from his
list of freeholders."
It was further urged that the exercise of a one-man power in
the selection of a special jury was fraught with hazard, but the
court met the complaint by saying, at 214:
".. . we do not see why the act does not provide a method of
selection sufficient to secure impariality. If the sheriff does not
stand impartial between the parties, the judge may (shall) appoint
some judicious and disinterested party to make the list; and, if a
showing was made that furnished any reasonable ground for be-
lieving that the sheriff was not entirely impartial, it would be error
for the court to refuse to appoint some one else to act in his stead.
Moreover, if the sheriff selected a partial or unfair list . . . we
have no doubt of the power, as well as the duty, of the court to
set aside the list, on motion analogous to the old motion to quash
the array."
In Whitehead v. State82 the conviction of an Ohio prisoner
was reversed because of the refusal of the trial court to grant a
struck jury when duly demanded. Under the Ohio statute either
the state or the defendant accused of crime was entitled to have a
struck jury as of right, except in certain types of cases in which
a larger number of peremptories was allowable in trial by common
jury. The right to have a struck jury might be waived. 88
The compatibility of the New Jersey struck jury act with the
state constitution was affirmed in 1896 in Fowler v. State.8' The
same statute was further tested in Brown v. New Jersey"5 where
the United States Supreme Court held that the statute satisfied both
the due process and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The court stated:
"A struck jury . . . gives the defendant a reasonable opportunity
to ascertain the qualifications of proposed jurors, and to protect
himself against any supposed prejudices in the mind of any par-
ticular individual called as a juror. Whether better or no than
any other method, it is certainly a fair and reasonable way of
securing an impartial jury, was provided for by the laws of the
state, and that is all that due process in this respect requires." 80
In view of the specific holdings in the cases just reviewed, and
in view of the unquestioned acceptance and use of special juries in
82(1859) 10 Ohio State 449.83Hutchins v. Wick, (1878) 4 Ohio Dec. 170, 1 Cleve. Law Rep. 89.84Cited spra, footnotes 59 and 61.85Cited supra, footnote 63.
86(1899) 175 U. S. 172,176,20 Sup. Ct. 77,79,44 L. Ed. 119,121.
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various other states,87 it seems clear that, even if it'be true that
the special jury is not an integral part of the constitutional right
of the trial by jury,s8 the enactment of statutes providing for the
use of a form of the special jury is clearly within the province of
state legislatures.
IV. USE oF THE SPECIAL JURY IN THE UNITED STATES
The special jury has seen considerable use as a trial device in
America, not less than sixteen states 9 having at some time in their
developments enacted statutes expressly providing for a form of
special jury, and at least two states90 having used a special jury
without express legislative authorization. Some of the sixteen
states, e. g. Minnesota, 91 have repealed their special jury statutes,
in some the special jury is infrequently used, and in some states
special juries have been heavily used9" and are still used today. In
Georgia the only kind of trial jury extant is a special jury in a
form slightly modified from the common law.
Litigation Suited for the Special Jury.
The intrinsic merits of the special jury as a trial device may
perhaps be best judged by review and study of the types of cases
szSee Part IV of this article.88Folwell, Minnesota historian, intimates that special juries may have
been demandable as a constitutional right, remarking, op. cit., footnote 44,
supra, at 228: "Early Minnesota legislatures appear to have assumed that
struck juries would need statutory authority."
s9Alabama Code, Sec. 8663; Arkansas, Sand. & H. Dig. Sec. 4303; Dela-
ware, Rev. Code of 1935, Ch. 131, Secs. 25-27; Georgia Code, Secs. 59-106
through 59-110, Sec. 59-701 et seq. and Sec. 59-801 et seq.; Indiana, Baldwin's
Code 1934, Sec. 335; Louisiana Rev. St., Sec. 2125, 2153; Maryland Code,
Art. 50, Secs. 9, 13; Michigan, 21 Mich. Stat. Ann., Secs. 27.1023 through
27.1029; Minnesota, Gen. Laws 1864, c. 31 and Gen. Laws 1895, c. 328;
Missouri, Wag. Stat., p. 1102, See. 7; New Jersey Rev. Stat. 1937, Sec.
2:93-1 et seq.; New York, Judic., Sec. 749aa; Ohio, Swan's Rev. Stat., p.
492; Pennsylvania; Virginia Code of 1942, Sec. 6005; West Virginia Code
of 1943, Sec. 5647.
9ONew Jersey. In Denn, Lessee of Inskeep v. Lecony, (1790) 1 N. J.
Law 46, a special jury was used in an ejectment action and on appeal
counsel, in arguing to the appellate court, cited 3 Bi. Com. 357, and 3 Bac.
"Abr. 740 but no New Jersey statutes. There can be no doubt that the old
common-law system was then being used, although New Jersey later did
adopt a statute on special juries. Oregon. See Strickler v. Portland R., L.
& P. Co, (1916) 79 Or. 526, 144 Pac. 1193, 155 Pac. 1195.91The Minnesota statute, enacted in 1864, was repealed in 1891, re-
enacted in 1895, then repealed again in 1897. Folwell, op. cit. footnote 44,
at'228, 230, states that the reason for the repeal in 1891 "remains to be dis-
covered," and describes the re-enactment in 1895 as "equally mysterious."
The ultimate repeal in 1897 he explains as induced by the demands of
"shyster" lawyers prosecuting personal injury claims against corporations,
on the theory that the ordinary panel was more sympathetic with injured
clients.92Alabama, New Jersey, New York.
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in which such juries have been used. Undoubtedly special juries
have been used in some cases where common juries might well
have proved equally advantageous. Nevertheless it is worthy of
note that the special jury has been used with success in cases of
extraordinary intricacy.
In Matter of Amos F. Eno93 the proponent of a will applied for
a special jury under the New York statute permitting use of such
juries in the discretion of the judge in "intricate and important"
cases. The court found that the history of the case brought it
within the statute and justified granting the application. The estate
of the decedent whose alleged will was under contest amounted to
more than $6,000,000.00 in personal property and involved real
property of an assessed valuation of $4,792,500.00. The testator
had disposed of $4,600,000.00 of his estate to his living descendants,
then had given legacies to the American Museum of Natural His-
tory, New York University, and four other charitable institutions.
Columbia University was named as residuary legatee. On the first
trial over one hundred thirty-five witnesses had testified, and a
mass of documentary evidence had been introduced. The case had
then been appealed, reversed for errors occurring at the trial 4
and remanded for retrial of the issue of testamentary capacity.
Appearing before the Surrogate's Court on the second trial were
fifteen parties, each represented by one or more. counsel or law
firms, including among them the eminent lawyers Rufus Choate
and William M. Evarts.
A special jury was used in 1943 in the Maryland case, Alex-
ander v. R. D. Grier & Sons Co.95 The plaintiff was the statutory
liquidator of a Pennsylvania reciprocal insurance exchange, who
had been ordered by the Pennsylvania court having jurisdiction
of the liquidation to collect assessments decreed to be due and
owing from policy holders. This was an action brought by the
liquidator to collect assessments from a Maryland corporation
which held twenty-two policies on which assessments were due
under the Pennsylvania decree.
In Industrial & General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod9" the plaintiff, a
bondholder, had pursuant to agreement deposited bonds with the
members of a committee engaged in an endeavor to reorganize the
railroad upon the property of which the bonds were a charge. Plain-
93(N.Y. 1922) 118 Misc. 431.
94(1921) 196 App. Div. 131.
95(Md. 1943) 30 At. (2d) 757.96(1905) 46 Misc. 492, 95 N. Y. Supp. 44.
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tiff having brought action for damages for breach of the agree-
ment, the defendants moved for a special jury under the New
York statute. The court granted the motion, explaining the neces-
sity for a special jury as follows:
"Through their departure from the terms of the agreement un-
der which the plaintiff deposited its bonds, for the purposes of the
reorganization, the defendants have incurred a liability the measure
of which depends upon the jury's estimate of the actual value of
this railroad 'as a going railroad, 119 miles long, with land, depots,
rolling stock, wharves, and appurtenances, * * * and it -was for the
jury to estimate the value of the bonded property according to
their sound judgment, and draw the proper inference as to the
proportionate amount that the plaintiff should recover in order to
make good the loss it had sustained.'
97
".. . If the finding of damage is to be b~sed upon inference,
rather than surmise and conjecture, the jury's equipment of in-
telligence and of practical business experience should be of the
best which any established method of selection may secure in the
interests of substantial justice. Indeed, to grasp the facts and mtake
a fairly intelligent estimate of the values involved, each juror
should lve mich of the capacity for financial analysis which a
successful reorganizer of railroad properties nay be deemed to
possess, and, without prolonging the discussion, it is obvious that
the extraordinary, rather than the ordinary, procedure available
for the choice of a jury will tend to provide the more adequate
equipment of the tribunal of fact."981
One of the most striking pieces of litigation in which the spe-
cial jury has figured was the series of New York cases entitled
People v. Tweed. At least twelve reported cases bearing that name
alone arose from this set of facts: public officials high in the govern-
ment of the municipal corporation of New York City conspired to
defraud the city of public funds. The officials included, besides
defendant Tweed, who was the president of the board of super-
visors, the mayor and the city comptroller. Together these men
conspired to have fraudulent claims set up, allowed and paid, the
officials obtaining and converting the money to their own use. The
amounts thus mulcted from the City of New York over a period
of many years totaled several million dollars. One of the cases
involving $6,198,957.00 was popularly known as "the six-million
suit,"99 and another involving over one million dollars was popu-
97The court was quoting from the opinion in the previous appeal of the
same cause on a legal question preliminary to trial, viz. Industrial &
General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod, (1905) 180 N. Y. 215, 73 N. E. 7.
9895 N. Y. Supp. at 45. Italics supplied.99People v. Tweed, (1872) 13 Abb. Pr. (N.S.) 25; People Y. Tweed.(1876) 50 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 262
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larly known as "the one-million case."'100 The action brought
against Tweed, who was held on bail of one million dollars, was
once discontinued when the court held the people had no right to
sue in these circumstances. To cure the defect the state legislature
in 1875 passed an act specifically authorizing prosecution of the
suit in the name of the people, and the litigation was resumed. The
famous lawyers David Dudley Field and Elihu Root represented
Tweed, but he was duly convicted by a special jury, the conviction
being affirmed in 1877.101
Special juries have been used frequently in litigation involving
stocks and bonds or banking institutions. In Arkansas a struck jury
was used in a controversy relating to the sale and purchase of the
capital stock of a bank. Plaintiff in the action, Myers v. Martin,
10 2
had purchased some of the stock from defendant and had sued
to recover damages for fraudulent misrepresentations as to the
value of the stock. A Minnesota case, Branch v. Davsonu,'0 used
such a jury ifh an action to recover from the defendant banking-
house a deposit allegedly made by plaintiff's husband in her name
before his death. In the course of the trial it became necessary
to introduce in evidence the account-books of the bank. Again, in
Lockhart v. State"' a special jury was used in a Maryland criminal
prosecution of members of a firm of stock and bond brokers for
conspiracy to defraud firm customers.
There is a variation in the practice of the several states with
respect to the use of special juries in criminal cases. Some of the
states have held that the local statute relating to special juries does
not apply in criminal cases.' 05 In other states the use of special
juries has been specifically authorized by statute.100
Where, as in Virginia and New York, the grant or refusal of
a special jury rests in the sound discretion of the court, and such
juries are awarded only in cases of intricacy or importance, several
'OoPeople v. Tweed, (1876) 50 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 280.
1o'People v. Tweed, (1877) 11 Hun. (N.Y.) 195.
102(1925) 168 Ark. 1028, 272 S. W. 856.
103(1886) 36 Minn. 193,30 N. W. 545.
104(1924) 145 Md. 602, 125 Atl. 829.
'
05State v. Miller, (1873) 6 W. Va. 600; State v. Pearis, (W. Va.
1891) 13 S. E. 1006; In re Calling Jurors, (1886) 1 Pa. Co. Ct. R. 644. In the
case last cited the court gave its oral opinion that the Pennsylvania act of
1885 was not intended for use in criminal cases because the effect would
be to reduce the defendant from twenty peremptory challenges to four strikes.
In civil cases by common jury only four peremptories were allowable, so
use of a special jury in civil cases would make no difference in this respect.
lOAlabama (made necessary by Turney v. State, (1910) 168 Ala.
128, 52 So. 910, which held the previous special jury statute did not apply
to criminal cases) ; New Jersey; and New York.
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principles are well settled. The mere fact that the parties in a case
are powerful or important does not make the case itself important
so as to justify grant of a special jury.10 7 Nor does the importance
of the case sufficient to warrant use of a special jury necessarily
follow because a large sum of money is involved.10 8
In AtI. & D. R. Co. v. Peake,109 the Virginia court approved
the denial of a motion for special jury on the ground that the case
.was "not one in its nature of exceptional difficulty or importance."
The action was one brought against a railroad company for damages
resulting from an overflow of water upon plaintiff's land following
construction of the railroad upon adjacent lands, allegedly without
sufficient provision for drainage. In libel cases even the most
prominent of public officials cannot expect to use a special jury
unless the libel is made against him in his official capacity.110 The
rule allowing special juries in such cases, where the libel relates
to conduct as p public official, was well settled in New York as early
as 1809. Then in Thonias v. Ruamsey"' the court, relying on prece-
dent, allowed a special jury in an action based on libelous statements
of and concerning plaintiff, a representative in the United States
Congress, relating to his official conduct.111"
Where a cause affects the public a special jury will be granted.
A special jury was granted for this reason in New-Windsor Turn-
'pike Co. v. Ellison' in which plaintiff company brought an
action for defrauding it of its tolls. The defendant had removed a
fence near the turnpike gate and had made a highway across his
land whereby he and others could avoid the turnpike. It was urged
by the defendant that his acts were for his private accommodation.
A motion for special jury was granted because "this kind of ques-
tion affects the public and is important in its consequences."
107(1890) 87 Va. 130, 12 S. E. 348.
s08In Livingston v. Smith, (1806) 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 141, a special jury
was allowed in a consolidated cause involving total loss on two insurance
policies of $10,000 and $18,000 respectively. However, in Anonymous, (18061
1 Johns. (N.Y.) 314, and Wright v. Columbia Ins. Co., (1807) 2 Johns.
(N.Y.) 211, special juries were refused where the only basis urged was the
money sum involved ($1,000.00 and $27,500.00, respectively).109(1890) 87 Va. 130, 12 S. E. 348.
11oVan Vechten v. Hopkins, (1807) 2 Johns. (N.Y.) 373. Rule for special
jury refused because the libel was not made against plaintiff in his official
character.
111 (1809) 4 Johns. (-N.Y.) 186.
112Accord: Livingston v. Cheetham, (1806) 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 61;
Jerome v. N. Y. Evening Journal Publ. Co., (1908) 108 N. Y. S. 801, rev'ing
(1907) 108 N. Y. S. 1136; Coler v. Brooklyn Daily Eagle, (1909) 117
N. Y. S.273.
113(1806) 1 Johns. (N.Y.) 141.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In People ex rel. Stemiler v. McGuire 4 a special jury was
sought in a case in the nature of quo warranto to try the title to
the office of justice of the district court in New York City. It was
held that the controversy was not such as to excite the attention
or provoke the prejudices of the population, since the office and
election were merely local and did not even extend to the whole
city. The court stated that "a struck jury will not be granted
except in extreme cases" and quoted from another case: "Parties
deceive themselves in the estimate of the extent of interest which
the public at large take in their controversies. ' 15
Other cases in which special juries have been ordered include:
an action for damages in which there had been two mistrials and
one verdict set aside, the special jury being granted to avoid local
prejudices;116 a criminal prosecution for assault with intent to
kill in which a regular jury in term had disagreed, the special jury
being granted to obviate the necessity of awaiting the next term,
thus assuring speedy trial ;117 and a pre-Civil War action to recover
damages for the death of a slave brought against the overseer who
had killed the slave.'
1 8
American Decisions on Special Jury Procedure.
Among states having statutes governing selection and use of
special juries, there is some difference of opinion as to the correct
spirit of interpretation of those statutes. At least two courts have
held that the terms of the respective statutes involved were manda-
tory, and that departures from the terms of the statute resulted
in reversible error.
Gulf, etc. Railway Co. v. Shane'" held the 1890 Act of the
Territory of Oklahoma relating to trial by struck jury to be
mandatory and reversed the case because the lower court had
devised and used a system radically different from that provided
by the statute. Again, in Republic Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Elrod12 0
the lower court put into a box twenty-one names of qualified
jurors where the Arkansas statute required the use of twenty-four
names from which eighteen were to be drawn by lot. It was held
that the court had committed reversible error as the provisions
of the special jury statute were "mandatory and unambiguous."
114(1872) 43 How. Prac. (N.Y.) 67, 69.
115Patchin v. Sands, (1833) 10 Wend. (N.Y.) 570.
l16Clingan v. E. T., Va. & G. R. R. Co., (1879) 70 Tenn. (2 Lea.) 726.
1
'-Pierce v State, (1879) 67 Ind. 354.
"
8 Davis v. Hunter, (1844) 7 Ala. 135.
119(1894) 157 U. S. 351, 15 S. Ct. 641, 39 L. Ed. 727.
10(1945) 208 Ark. 150, 185 S. W. (2d) 99.
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On the other hand, the Alabama court vehemently refused to
class the local statute as mandatory in Brown z. State.12' The court
held there was no error in selection of a panel by only one judge
where the statute directed the use of two judges, stating that
otherwise the statute would be a "cog in the wheels of justice"
and "a monstrous piece of folly" on the part of the legislature.
The question of the mandatory or directory character of the
jury selection statute may be settled easily in states -22 which have
enacted legislation abolishing the common-law challenge to the
array. In such states the statute ipso facto becomes directory, as
minor discrepancies in the formation of the panel cannot be
reached, although the rights of litigants are protected where pre-
judicial error occurs. 123
The challenge to the array may indeed have a deeper signifi-
cance in the problem under discussion. In McDermott v. Hoff-
2nan, 24 an ejectment action in which trial by struck jury had been
ordered, one of the defendants appealed urging an objection to
the method of summoning the jury. The court affirmed judgment
against the defendant on the ground that defendants did not
challenge the array "which-was the only proper mode of raising
the objection," and stated further that "At all events, the exception
should have been taken before the jury were sworn."
And in the Oregon case of Strickler v. Portland Ry., L. & P.
Co., where the appellant complained that the cause had been tried
by special jury, the court held, despite the fact that Oregon has
no special jury statute, that the Oregon statute prohibiting chal-
lenge to the panel precluded consideration of the objection. The
court stated:
"No objection to any particular juror or to the jury is contained
in the record. Sec. 117, L. 0. L., provides that no challenge shall
be made or allowed to a panel. None of the jurors having been
challenged, we cannot consider this matter."'' 2 5
A matter of proper method in special jury cases which has
several times been adjudicated is the question of the mechanics of
the selection of a jury where two or more persons are joined as
121(1923) 209 Ala. 490, 493, 96 So. 475. Accord: Morgan v. State,
(1923) 19 Ala. App. 257, 96 So. 786.
-
22E. g., California, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, New York, Oregon and
Washington.
123Striclder v. Portland Ry., L. & P. Co., (1916) 79 Or. 526, 144 Pac.
1193, 155 Pac. 11J95.124(1870) 70 Pa. St 31.
125(1916) 79 Or. 526, 531, 155 Pac. 1195, 1196.
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defendants in a single action. Each defendant sometimes demands
a separate panel and separate strikes. In Richmond & Danille
R. R. Co. v. Greenwood 2 each of two defendants demanded a
struck jury. The case was an action for personal injuries sus-
tained in a collision between trains owned by the two defending
railroads. The lower Alabama court refused to allow a separate
panel for each defendant. On appeal the court held this refusal
was not error, but reversed the case for errors occurring in in-
structing the jury.
Similarly in Montgomery & Eufaula Railway Co. v. Thomp-
son,'27 a personal injury case, the plaintiff demanded a struck
jury. The defendants objected that a struck jury was improper
because there were several defendants and two distinct defenses,
with the argument that the defendants would be unable to agree
on strikes. The Alabama court allowed a special jury, the defen-
dants to strike in rotation when disagreement as to the strikes
arose. The appellate court approved these rulings, reversing the
case on other grounds.
The Maryland court has twice followed the same view. In
Diamond State Telephone Co. v. Blake"28 two defendants were
required to join in striking. The court, in denying defendants a
right to have the full number of strikes for each defendant, used
a reductio ad absurdunt argument: if there were five plaintiffs
and one defendant, or six parties, all of the panel could be struck,
leaving no jurors to try the case, under the rule contended for by
defendants. An earlier decision, Hamlin v. State,'12 had announced
the same ruling in a criminal prosecution involving two defendants.
Two separate actions against one defendant were consolidated
in Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Willingham'a" and an order
for special jury was obtained. The defendant claimed it was en-
titled to a double panel of jurors from which to strike. The court
held that only one panel with the usual twenty-four jurors was
allowable. In Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Ratliffe,1 8' a
demand for special jury came too late when organization of a
common jury to try the case had already been started.
All jurors on the special jury panel must be unexceptionable
126(1892) 99 Ala. 501, 14 So. 495.
127(1884) 77 Ala. 448.
128(1907) 105 Md. 570, 66 Atl. 631.
129(1887) 67 Md. 542, 10 Atl. 214.
130(1942) 240 Ala. 333, 199 So. 711.
131(1909) 164 Ala. 147, 51 So. 335.
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for cause13 2 before the parties begin striking.133 In K. C. M. & B.
R. R. Co. v. Ferguson, Adinrs."s ' it was stated that the proper
practice is for the judge to interrogate jurors, rather than the
parties, with the view that otherwise the examination might "de-
generate into a mere fishing procedure, wearying jurors, and need-
lessly consuming the public time." Likewise, in State v. WeLshIt
the lower court's a ction was approved when it refused to permit the
plaintiff-appellant to examine the panel to discover how to exer-
cise his strikes, the court stating that parties are entitled to
examine the panel only to ascertain causes for disqualification.
But where the court improperly overrules a challenge for cause
and the challenging party strikes the name of that particular juror
from the panel, on appeal he is not precluded from urging the
improper ruling as error.138
Where an inadequate number of special jurors appear or an
insufficient number-of qualified jurors remains upon the panel
after examination, according to most authorities the court should
fill the panel before striking by ordering a "tales" or summoning
"talesmen," i.e. directing the sheriff to procure additional jurors
to the number designated by the court.'37 It is improper to fill the
jury from the general panel,"83 unless, of course, the names of
special jurors are all taken from the general panel as a matter of
local practice.1" 9 Nor is it proper to impanel bystanders to fill
vacancies on the special jury, though this error was held to be
harmless where the objecting appellant had unused strikes left
which'he could have used to remedy the matter. 40 A recent Mary-
land case, however, was more liberal, leaving the necessity of filling
up the panel within the discretion of the trial court.' 4'
"32Dothard v. Denson, (1882) 72 Ala. 541; Louisville & Nashville R. R.
Co. v. Young, (1910) 168 Ala. 551, 53 So. 213; Lee v. Peter, (1834) 6 Gill
& J. (Md.) 447; Gray v. State, (1937) 173 Md. 690, 195 Ad. 591; Ross,
Lessee v. Eason, (1796) 2 Yeates (Pa.) 126.
"'3Steed v. Knowles, (1893) 97 Ala. 573, 17 So. 75; Smith v. Kaufman,
(1893) 100 Ala. 408, 14 So. 111; Dees v. State, (1921) 18 Ala. App. 133, 89
So. 95.
14(1904) 143 Ala. 512, 39 So. 348.
135(1931) 160 Md. 602, 125 Aft. 829.
"S6 Brown v. Woolverton, (1929) 219 Ala. 112, 121 So. 404; Southern
Ry. Co. v. Milan,.(1940) 240 Ala. 333, 199 So. 711.
"'7Anonymous (U.S. C.C. Pa. Dist. 1797) 2 U. S. (2 Dall.) 382; Steed
v. Knowles, (1893) 97 Ala. 573, 17 So. 75; Watson v. St. Paul City Ry. Co,
(1889) 42 Minn. 46, 43 N. V. 904; Atlee v. Shaw, (1805) 4 Yeates (Pa.)
236.
138 Carter v. Ramsey, (Pa. Com. P. 1878) 1 Del. Co. R. 423.
"39McDermott v. Hoffman, (1871) 70 Pa. St. 31.
'40Evansville & L. I. Traction Co. v. Johnson (Ind. App. 1912) 97
N. E. 176.
14'Mitchell v. State, (1940) 178 Md. 579, 16 Atl. (2d) 161. No error
where appealing defendant had been presented with a panel of 20 qualified
jurors from which to strike, though the total panel had fallen from 25 to 22.
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Occasionally courts have required each party to take the
strikes to which he is entitled without permitting either to know
which jurors had been struck by the adverse party. In Railway
Co. v. DobbiIIs142 the court found it was not required to rule on
whether keeping the strikes secret constituted error, because the
parties had actually struck different jurors in every instance. Ac-
cordingly, the court ruled that the error, if any, was not prejudi-
cial. But in Lewis v. United States143 this action was unequivocally
held to be error. Where one of the parties refused to strike, it was
proper for the court to make his strikes for him.1 44
American courts have usually followed the common-law prac-
tice of charging the costs of the special jury to the party who
applied for it, except in certain circumstances.14 An Indiana court
interpreted the local special jury statute as "a statutory recognition
of the common-law method of obtaining this kind of special jury." 14"
In Pfisterer v. Key' 4' one of the parties applied for a special jury,
but when the jury had been drawn, neglected or refused to make a
deposit to cover the costs of the special jury. The sheriff then
refused to summon the jurors without the deposit. The applicant
for the special jury having urged on appeal that he had been
denied the right to have a special jury, the court found there had
been no error.
V. CAN THE SPECIAL JURY BE USEFUL TODAY?
The need for an improved method of handling certain types of
disputes is fairly shown by the expansion of commercial arbitra-
tion, by the tremendous growth of administrative tribunals, 148 and
by the increase in proposals for various types of specialized courts.
The demand for a competent tribunal in certain commercial cases
has been so great that arbitration courts, wherein the parties select
and mutually agree upon the most competent person or persons
142(1895) 60 Ark. 481, 31 S. W. 147.
143(1892) 146 U. S. 370, 13 S. Ct. 136, 36 L. Ed. 1011.44Reeves v. State, (1921) 17 Ala. App. 684, 88 So. 197.
145Wright v. Railway Co., (1894) 2 Mary. (Del. Super.) 141, 42 Att.
440.
'a6Board of Commissioners of Randolph County v. Board of Commis-
sioners of Henry County, (1901) 27 Ind. App. 378, 61 N. E. 612, 619.
147(1941) 218 Ind. 521, 33 N. E. (2d) 330.
14SBerle, Expansion of American Administrative Law, (1917) 30 Harv.
L. Rev. 430; Pound, Executive Justice, (1907) 46 Am. L. Reg. (N.S.) 137.
Dean Pound stated: "Executive justice is an evil. It has always been and
it always will be crude and as variable as the personalities of officials. ...
But any justice is better than no justice. The only way to check the onward
march of executive justice is to improve the output of judicial justice."
Italics supplied.
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available, have had frequent use. From small beginnings use of
commercial arbitration has increased in recent years until there has
now been organized a national group known as the American
Arbitration Association, regularly publishing its own periodical.149
That there is still considerable dissatisfaction with administra-
tive tribunals is well known. Nor does arbitration seem a complete
ans-wer, since it is only voluntary and to a certain extent lacks
legal sanctions. Hence it may well be that a means by which a
tribunal at least equally competent can be utilized as an integral
part of the judicial system would be welcomed. It is submitted that
the special jury, with its use properly controlled, would prove to be
a valuable trial device in certain situations today. It is not sug-
gested that the common jury should be supplanted or substantially
modified, but only that the special jury should be available as a
supplementary trial device for use in proper cases.
If the argument that the common-law special jury, as it existed
at the time of American national independence, is today allowable
in courts of general jurisdiction in the discretion of the court '10
is deemed to be sound, the mechanical and legal details of the
special jury system are fairly well formulated and reasonably
accessible in the English cases heretofore reviewed. 1 1 With the
common-law special jury as a working model, and with an open
mind for such modifications as may prove to be necessary to meet
local needs, the special jury could be an immediate adjunct to
contemporary jurisprudence.
On the other hand, if legislation is deemed necessary in par-
ticular jurisdictions to establish or to implement a system of
trial by special jury, three points deserve careful attention in
statutory drafting. First, designation of the occasions for use of
special juries should remain a matter in the discretion of the court,
and not a matter of right upon demand by the parties, or one of
the parties. Retention of the common-law practice of granting
-agArbitration Journal. In addition, commercial arbitration is sufficiently
widespread to have inspired serious consideration in conventional legal
periodicals, e.g. (1941) 4 U. Toronto L. J. 1-32, Commercial Arbitration
and the Rules of Law.
l5OSee Part III of this article.
"'See Part I of this article. In Goodson v. United States, (1898) 7 Okla.
117, 54 Pac. 423, where jury drawing provisions for criminal proceedings
were inadequate, it was held proper to resort to the common-law practice to
supply the procedural defects. One appropriate exception to the complete
acceptance of the English system is the lack of suitability of the provisions
relating to qualifications of jurors, since England's class distinctions are out
of line with American traditions. However, most of our states will be found
to have adopted statutes specifically relating to the qualifications of jurors.
Such statutes may be regarded as pro tanto amendatory of the common law.
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such a jury only when the judge, in his sound discretion, feels that
the case is a proper one for such a trial,'1 2 would assure its
best use. Under the watchful supervision of our judges utilization
of the special jury in improper cases, use of the special jury as a
means of obtaining delay, and attempted oppression by certain
types of litigants by use of the special jury would be minimized
or avoided.
Second, striking from the special jury panel out of the pres-
ence of the jurors, before the parties and attorneys have had an
opportunity to see the prospective jurors, and before the members
of the panel have been found to be unexceptionable for cause,
should be avoided. Modification of these common-law details would
be material departures from the striking principle, which is a sub-
stitute for the peremptory challenge and important for the pur-
pose of assuring prisoners and litigants that particular jurors, of
whom an unreasoning or inexplicable distrust is felt, will not be
imposed upon them.
Third, individual selection of every member of the trial jury
should be prevented. The officer selecting each panel should have
discretion in selecting those persons whose qualifications and back-
ground assure their competence for the case pending. But an
element of selection by lot should be present at some time between
formation of the panel and trial of the case in order to accord with
present-day accepted traditions as to impaneling of juries. Minor
modifications, such as changes in the number of names placed on
the panel or in the number of strikes, would be harmless and
might be found to be desirable.
If these three matters are adequately treated, it is submitted
that the resultant special jury will be a fair and an advantageous
trial device, worthy of extensive use by the American bar.
-JEANNETrE E. THATCHER
1
521n the Court of King's Bench, a rule for trial by special jury was
discretionary on cause shown. Style, 477; 8 Mod. 248; 2 Ld. Raym. 1364; 2
Lil. Reg. 154, 155. In the Court of Common Pleas the rule was at first of
course. Barnes, Notes Cas. 449, 61, 88; 5 Durn. & E. 464. But after 1812 the
rule in Common Pleas was also discretionary. Bloxam, Knt. v. Brown, 4
Taunt. 471, 128 Eng. Rep. 411.
